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Abstract 
Enlargement fatigue has descended upon the European Union (EU) institutions, which remain focused 
on resolving the Brexit crisis and ongoing internal reforms. This multi-faceted phenomenon has 
directly caused the so-called accession fatigue in potential EU members, which are increasingly 
turning to other geopolitical alternatives. Russia and China are the new dominant powerbrokers in 
the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, courting political and business elites in EU candidate states and 
offering an alternative foreign policy option which contrasts with the stalled EU enlargement process. 
This paper discusses the rise of these external powers in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, 
suggesting three scenarios for the future of the Balkan region where the EU, Russia and China are 
more vigorously vying for influence than ever before. 
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Introduction  
A new phase in ‘enlargement fatigue’ has been gripping the European Union (EU) since 
Croatia became the 28th EU member state on 1 July 2013, after a decade-long political 
process.1 This paper posits the argument that enlargement fatigue has contributed to 
the emergence of an ‘accession fatigue’ among potential EU member states. Accession 
fatigue may be characterised by a general sense of social apathy and political sclerosis 
in prospective member states in which political elites start believing that they have 
been left out, isolated, ignored or more punished than rewarded in their work towards 
attaining membership of the EU. 2  As a result, they become less committed to 
continuing with democratic and EU-oriented reforms, which aim to align the 
legislative, administrative and legal systems in the candidate states with the EU 
regulatory framework. This complex phenomenon is contributing to the electoral 
                                                        
1 Academic Anna Szolucha argues that enlargement fatigue is not a new concept as its earlier manifestations were 
well-documented in the EU’s history. Anna Szolucha, ‘The EU and “Enlargement Fatigue”: why has the European 
Union not been able to counter “Enlargement Fatigue”? Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(1), 
pp.107–22, May 2010. 
2 As at early 2018, the official candidates for EU membership are Albania (applied in 2009, candidate since 2014), 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (candidate since 2005), Montenegro (applied in 2008, candidate 
since 2010), Serbia (applied in 2009, candidate since 2012) and Turkey (candidate since 1999). Potential 
candidates from the Balkan region are Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo under United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999). European Commission, ‘Enlargement: candidate countries and potential 





success of more Eurosceptic political elites, who are increasingly turning away from 
the EU towards other geopolitical alternatives (including non-democratic states) for 
political support on various issues, and for funding and partnerships. This presents a 
negative development for the EU’s foreign and security policy. It threatens to derail 
two decades of the EU’s transformative work in its immediate neighbourhood, 
especially in the Balkan region where the EU invested immeasurable amounts of 
political, human and financial capital during that period.3  
Furthermore, official or potential candidate states risk moving further away from 
democracy into semi-authoritarian governance, thereby fuelling the espousal of anti-
EU enlargement attitudes by an increasing majority of EU citizens and institutions.4 
Countries such as Russia and China are actively contributing to such tendencies by 
increasing their own presence, or agency in the EU’s neighbourhood. This paper will 
draw attention to the rise of Russia’s and China’s influence in the Balkans, which is not 
limited to non-EU states. Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union is seen as an attractive 
option by several of the Balkan States. In a similar way, China’s New Silk Road political 
and economic project will be examined in the second part of this paper, as it may offer 
a geopolitical alternative to the accession fatigue felt by many Balkan nations. 5 
However, it offers no permanent solution to the Balkan region’s endemic 
underdevelopment and the need for economic integration within the EU. 
Southern and Eastern Europe have emerged as fundamental to China’s new foreign 
policy assertiveness in Europe. Serbia has become a ‘test case’, being the country in the 
Balkans which has attracted the largest amount of Chinese investment and soft loans 
since the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in 
2009—considered by Chinese President Xi Jinping to be a ‘milestone’ in cooperation 
with countries in that region.6 China’s growing influence in Serbia has been the subject 
of interest in Japan also, with the Japanese Prime Minister visiting the small Balkan 
nation for the first time in over three decades to promote Japanese soft power as a 
possible balance to China.7 This paper concludes with final thoughts about what kind 
of challenge Russia and China might present to the EU in its neighbourhood in the 
future.  
Enlargement fatigue 
Enlargement fatigue refers to a deliberate policy decision by key EU institutional 
players in enlargement policy, in particular the European Commission, to prevent any 
future enlargement until the next decade. Hostility within and among member states 
to further expanding the EU started to mount after the so-called ‘Big Bang 
                                                        
3 I would like to thank Nigel Brew for his helpful suggestions in this paper.  
4 Toby Helm, ‘How the Tory right turned away from EU enlargement’, The Guardian, 22 December 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/21/tories-conservatives-eu-enlargement-bulgaria, accessed 12 
December 2017. 
5 Geoff Wade, ‘China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative’, Parliamentary Library Briefing Book, Parliamentary 
Library, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 2016, pp. 148–151. 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/4787355/upload_binary/4787355.pdf;fileType=a
pplication/pdf, accessed 12 December 2017. 
6 Upon visiting Serbia in June 2016, Chinese leader Xi Jinping observed: ‘We are developing One Belt, One Road 
project … with its position and advantages Serbia will have a significant place in this … This cooperation should be 
an example of Chinese cooperation with countries in Southern and Eastern Europe’. Ivana Sekularac, ‘China’s Xi 
sees Serbia as milestone on new “Silk Road”’, Reuters, 19 June 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-
china/chinas-xi-sees-serbia-as-milestone-on-new-silk-road-idUSKCN0Z50DV, accessed 12 December 2017. 
7 Liubomir K. Topaloff, ‘Japan, China, and the Western Balkans’, Diplomat, 22 January 2018, 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japan-china-and-the-western-balkans/, accessed 24 January 2018. 
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enlargement’ in May 2004, which saw the EU grow massively from 15 to 25 members.8 
With this 6th enlargement of the EU, the Brussels-overseen population and territory 
expanded by around 20 per cent, while the EU’s per-capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) decreased by some 9 per cent.9 Poorer countries became a rallying point for 
anti-EU enlargement critics. Delays in Bulgaria’s and Romania’s EU accession (which 
eventually occurred in 2007 despite strong objections from the European Court of 
Auditors) were symptomatic of the tough times to come for official EU membership 
candidates and potential candidate states.10 Greater plurality and diversity among EU 
members increase the potential for disagreement between any of these countries and 
a candidate state (as happened with Croatia’s accession amid unresolved maritime 
issues with Slovenia), which in turn could delay the candidate’s accession process, as 
it did for Croatia. For Serbia, specific bilateral issues with different EU members such 
as Croatia, Romania and Lithuania have at different points in time made the Serbian 
Government’s accession efforts more difficult.  
The EU’s inward focus after the Eurozone crisis 
During the current European Commission’s term (2014–19), EU internal challenges 
have been dominating the work of the College of Commissioners (especially fiscal and 
monetary affairs and the issue of Brexit), alongside some specific exogenous challenges 
(such as an unprecedented spike in asylum seekers from predominantly the Middle 
East and North Africa, and the threat of terrorism). This inward focus has contributed 
to accession fatigue in many potential EU members (including Serbia), in which the 
staunchest pro-EU political elites have lost domestic legitimacy. In some cases, those 
elites were over-promising in terms of joining the EU sooner than politically feasible. 
In other cases, the incomplete democratic transformation produced many socio-
economic problems and exacerbated political divisions on a national level, including 
on the issue of EU membership. Such an outcome runs contrary to a widely-held belief 
among EU members that the EU’s attractiveness as a successful model to emulate is 
‘naturally’ inevitable and permanent for candidate states. A formidable membership 
option certainly kept the reform process going for many of the previous candidate 
states in the 1990s, when the political will inside the EU to expand was much stronger 
(and membership perspective more credible for candidates) than is the case in early 
2018.  
In focusing more inward on solving its own internal challenges and in addressing 
asymmetrical security threats, the EU has become oblivious to the fact that in the 
absence of a clear and unequivocal enlargement perspective, other rising powers could 
be vying for influence, better economic access and quite possibly, strategic advantage 
in its immediate neighbourhood. Serbia, as one of five official candidate states, is a case 
in point, but not an isolated example, of this relatively new and under-researched 
phenomenon. This paper also points to a less obvious accession criterion which 
presupposes an alignment in foreign policy outlook and the international affairs of the 
candidate state. Serbia and Turkey in particular are countries which currently have the 
lowest level of such alignment with the European Union’s common declarations, 
                                                        
8 ‘A case of enlargement fatigue’, The Economist, 11 May 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/6914116, 
accessed 12 December 2017. 
9 This paper considers that East Germany’s entry into the European Union through its unification with an existing 
member (West Germany) should be counted as a distinct episode in the EU’s enlargement history.  
10 Georgi Gotev, ‘Romania and Bulgaria were not ready for accession, EU auditors confess’, Euractiv, 13 
September 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/auditors-romania-and-bulgaria-were-





statements and sanctioning regime, which is unlikely to be viewed favourably by the 
EU institutions in terms of accession. 
In the late 2000s, it was the Eurozone crisis that the EU’s enlargement policy hit hard. 
Adverse effects from the Greek sovereign debt crisis were serious for the Balkan states, 
and included the slowing down of their economic growth, worse prospects for reform, 
less attainable EU funding for reform-oriented projects and a lower level capacity to 
fulfil stringent accession criteria. Enlargement also presupposes deep structural 
reforms, which can be highly unpopular at the domestic level. Political scientist Ritsa 
Panagiotou has warned that the EU is losing both credibility and appeal to several 
candidates specifically because of the Eurozone crisis. 11  Furthermore, Oxford 
University’s Professor of Southeast European Politics, Othon Anastasakis, observed at 
the start of the Eurozone crisis that the EU’s political conditionality strategy (as part of 
its enlargement policy) began to emphasise more the ‘journey’ of reform, than the 
outcome of accession, which only added to the loss of credibility.12 Hence, the more 
inward focus of the EU due to the economic crisis fuelled enlargement fatigue, which 
fanned the rise of accession fatigue and Euroscepticism in candidate states.  
New sources of external influence: Russia, China and others 
Russia and China are two major international players whose soft power and presence 
in the Balkans has grown exponentially over the past decade. Turkey is another 
example, as are Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. However, this paper 
will examine predominantly the growth of Chinese soft power and influence in Serbia. 
Russian soft power and influence will be analysed mainly in relation to the Kosovo 
issue as an in-depth study was recently completed on that topic.13 This paper argues 
that such expansion of external, non-EU influence in Serbia is not accidental. It entails 
a deliberate policy action on behalf of external, non-EU powers. Its principle is simple: 
that investing in greater presence and influence in the Balkans should bring short to 
medium-term economic, political and strategic advantages to the investor.  
Uncertainty over further enlargement of the EU has radically changed the geopolitical 
landscape on the Balkan Peninsula and opened up new sources of funding for local 
initiatives. The contemporary NGO sector in the Balkans is large, and all levels of 
society benefit from projects associated with external partners and funding. In some 
areas of the Balkans, the NGO sector significantly improves employment job prospects 
for the young and educated. Russia and China are deliberately using accession fatigue 
in countries such as Serbia to encroach on political, social and economic spaces which 
the EU has sought to re-create following the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia.  
Serbia is a candidate state who’s foreign and security policy outlook appears to be 
drifting away from Euro-Atlantic integration processes, in part because of the EU’s lack 
of political will to expand further.14 Other candidates and potential candidates could 
                                                        
11 Ritsa Panagiotou, ‘The Greek Crisis as a crisis of EU enlargement: how will the Western Balkans be affected?’, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 13(1), 2013, pp. 89–104. 
12 Othon Anastasakis, ‘The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic 
approach’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8(4), 2008, pp. 365–77. 
13 A larger study into Russia’s soft power in the Balkans had already been undertaken and published by the Center 
for Euro-Atlantic Studies in May 2016. See Eyes wide shut. Strengthening of Russian soft power in Serbia: goals, 
instruments and effects, Belgrade, Study of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, May 2016. 
14 Vladimir Krulj, ‘Serbia torn between EU attraction and China ambition’, Financial Times, 4 November 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/f1570558-bffb-11e7-b8a3-38a6e068f464, accessed 12 December 2017.  
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well resort to the same political option. There are already indications that Albania is 
developing closer links with Turkey in the hope that this will increase its own national 
capacities and economic growth.15 A potential convergence of enlargement fatigue and 
accession fatigue is not likely to produce a more democratic, peaceful and stable EU 
neighbourhood in the Balkans. The vacuum left by the EU (which remains focused on 
other priorities) will lead to other international players with political, economic and 
geo-strategic interest in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood to entering the Balkans 
relatively freely, most likely to the detriment of EU-oriented reforms and 
transformative projects. This is why the European Commission has recently embarked 
on a new initiative to improve accession prospects for the remaining Balkan states. 
However, there has been some scepticism expressed by Germany about the proposed 
year for the next wave of enlargement (2025), which makes the EU’s commitment to 
further expanding less credible.16 
The EU’s respite from enlargement and Brexit 
The European Commission manages the enlargement process from the European 
Union’s side. However, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
(particularly since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) can have a major impact 
on any development relating to new member accessions. The Directorate-General of 
Enlargement within the European Commission provides annual progress reports 
about the reform efforts by candidates, offering recommendations for improvement. 
These reports are publicly available and include information relating to the internal 
reforms of the candidate states as well as their international relations. They may also 
reflect on the behaviour of the candidates’ citizens overseas, and incorporate the 
concerns of EU members about nationals of the candidate state. For example, in the 
Commission’s 2016 progress report, the Serbian Government is urged to ‘maintain its 
efforts to decrease the number of unfounded asylum applications lodged by its 
nationals in EU Member States’.17 Interestingly, Serbia considers Kosovo to be part of 
Serbia, while Kosovo citizens can travel to the EU using either Serbian or Kosovar 
travel documents, which presents another anomaly for EU policymakers, including in 
asylum applications.18 Currently, EU-Serbia negotiations are based on the negotiating 
framework involving thirty-three chapters, which are thematically organised. Political 
scientist John O’Brennan calls these annual publications ‘stagnation reports’, which, 
because of the loss of the EU membership ‘carrot’, have become a source of further 
disappointment and disillusionment for the candidate state.19 
As with every EU membership applicant, the accession process is multi-faceted and 
comprehensive, and annual progress reports are often perceived by the candidate state 
as intrusive and highly political. Alignment in the candidate state with more than 
150,000 pages of EU legal documents, values and norms (acquis communautaire) is a 
                                                        
15 Anes Alic, ‘Vying for influence in the Balkans’, Radio Free Europe, 2 December 2010, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/Vying_For_Influence_In_The_Balkans/2059788.html, accessed 12 December 2017. 
16 Eszter Zalan, ‘EU divided over Western Balkan enlargement’, 15 February 2018, 
https://euobserver.com/enlargement/141002, accessed on 16 February 2018. 
17 European Commission, ‘Serbia 2016 progress report’, p. 6, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_serbia.pdf, accessed 12 December 
2017. 
18 In 2013, some 14,290 Kosovar citizens and 14,970 Serbian citizens applied for asylum in the EU. Statista 
website, https://www.statista.com/statistics/455305/number-of-applications-for-asylum-in-the-eu-by-
nationality/, accessed 12 December 2017. 
19 John O’Brennan, ‘On the slow train ride to nowhere? The EU, enlargement fatigue and the Western Balkans’, 





politicised process which emerges as a highly important electoral issue in the candidate 
states. The economy of the candidate states often depends strongly on the investments 
made by EU countries which are their major economic partners, as well as on other 
types of funding from the EU in the form of grants, research collaborations and similar 
partnerships. The nature of the enlargement and accession processes underscores the 
importance of correct signalling from the European Union’s side about further 
enlargement, as the candidate without a ‘European perspective’ (or the option to join 
the EU) is prompted to look elsewhere for political and economic partnerships. China 
in particular has emerged as a formidable new partner and key new source of 
investment for major projects in the Balkans as part of its One Belt One Road initiative, 
which is viewed with scepticism by Brussels.  
Jean-Claude Juncker, the 12th President of the European Commission, whose 
mandate runs from November 2014 until October 2019, stated in his priorities for this 
vital EU position: 
Our citizens need a pause from enlargement so we can consolidate what has 
been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presidency of the 
Commission, ongoing negotiations will of course continue, and notably the 
Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further 
enlargement will take place over the next five years.20 
President Juncker has placed the responsibility of maintaining enlargement 
aspirations onto the governments of candidate states, without acknowledging any of 
the difficulties candidate states face in doing so in the absence of a clear enlargement 
perspective. His sights were not on the neighbourhood policy but on the Commission 
resolving the British question during his presidency; the need to foster intra-EU 
economic growth and create a more stable monetary union, and the task of negotiating 
a ‘reasonable and balanced’ trade agreement with Washington. 21  The Juncker 
Commission faces the colossal task of working closely with the EU’s negotiating team 
on the issue of the UK’s intended departure from the EU (following the UK’s Brexit 
referendum on 23 June 2016). Over the past decade, British Conservatives, currently 
led by Prime Minister Theresa May, have been generally sceptical of further EU 
expansion because intra-EU diplomatic bargaining often linked the enlargement 
process with institutional deepening within the EU.22  
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements occurred under the British Labour Government 
led by Tony Blair, who believed that Western Europe’s enlargement policy provided an 
anchor of stability in its neighbourhood. Almost prophetically, then Prime Minister 
Blair warned two decades ago that without the realistic prospect of enlargement, 
‘political consensus behind economic and political reform in the weaker transition 
countries may splinter’.23 In October 2000 in his speech in Warsaw, Blair provided a 
strong British case for further EU enlargement:  
                                                        
20 Website of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, European People’s Party, ‘My foreign policy 
objectives’, emphasis added, http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities, accessed 12 December 2017. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Conservative British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was also known as being one of the major 
opponents to Germany’s reunification, and East Germany’s incorporation into the EU that followed.  
23 ‘A superpower, but not a superstate’, The Guardian, 7 October 2000, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2000/oct/07/uk.tonyblair, accessed 12 December 2017. 
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Britain will always be a staunch ally of all those European democracies applying 
to join the EU; a staunch ally wielding its influence at the centre of Europe.24 
Brexit, on the other hand, has already had a detrimental effect by delaying accession 
talks with official candidate states. This was evident during EU-Serbia negotiations in 
June 2016. Delays on the European Commission’s side regarding the opening of 
Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) of the negotiating framework with 
Serbia apparently occurred because the British could not present a policy position on 
the EU’s common negotiating stance because of technical difficulties, which included 
the resignation of the British Government (due to Brexit).25 Therefore, Brexit already 
presents a serious challenge to the EU’s enlargement policy, which did not adjust to 
the new situation. Furthermore, a lack of political will to expand further could also 
signal an emerging divide within the EU on the progress of intra-EU institutional 
reforms. These cumulative challenges have led to the European Commission adopting 
in February 2018 a new strategy on enlargement, which President Juncker outlined 
during his 2017 State of the Union address. 26  The intent behind this policy is to 
encourage further reforms in the EU candidate states, as well as to counter negative 
public opinion of the EU in the Balkan nations which have been grappling with 
enlargement and accession fatigue for a prolonged period.  
The asylum seeker issue and Kosovo-Serbia impasse 
Regional commentators on Balkan politics, Igor Štiks and Srećko Horvat, have 
observed that while the ‘EU has been the most powerful political and economic agent 
in a post-socialist Balkans’, its mission to bring peace and stability to that region 
through a series of reforms (including locally unpopular neoliberal economic reforms) 
risks becoming a derailed, even failed, project.27 Enlargement fatigue has, in their view, 
produced a sort of ‘ghettoisation’ of non-EU Balkan nations, which have also become 
a political quagmire with respect to the asylum seeker issue. O’Brennan has compared 
the situation in which EU candidate states now find themselves to a slow but aimless 
train ride.28 He recalls the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans summit of 2003 where it 
was confirmed by all EU members that the future of non-EU countries in the Balkans 
lies within the EU; that all those countries have what is referred to as the ‘European 
perspective’. However, that commitment and prospect now appear to be as distant as 
ever, with Russia and China among other international players seeking to benefit from 
the present lack of European perspective for the candidate states in the Balkans.  
In recent years, the Balkan region has become the frontline in the surge of asylum 
seeker influx into the EU. In Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, for example, it has become a 
common sight to see asylum seekers wandering around the city centre, shopping and 
even dining at the local cafes, some of which have started to change their menus to 
accommodate foreign food preferences and even Halal cuisine. More specifically, non-
                                                        
24 Ibid.  
25 Maja Poznatov, ‘Analysts: Brexit will slow EU enlargement in the Western Balkans’, Euractiv, 4 July 2016, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/analysts-brexit-will-slow-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-
balkans/, accessed 12 December 2017. 
26 European Commission,‘Strategy for the Western Balkans: EU sets out new flagship initiatives and support for 
the reform-driven region’, 6 February 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/news_corner/news/strategy-western-balkans-eu-sets-out-new-flagship-initiatives-and-support-
reform_en, accessed 12 February 2018. 
27 Srećko Horvat & Igor Štiks ‘Introduction: radical politics in the desert of transformation’, In Horvat Srećko and 
Štiks Igor (eds.) Welcome to the desert of post-socialism. Radical politics after Yugoslavia, 2015, pp. 8–10. 





EU countries in the Balkans have been tasked by the EU to construct and manage 
national holding centres for incoming asylum seekers, most of whom have come from 
the MENA region, but also Pakistan and Afghanistan. The EU and other international 
donors have provided funding for these facilities, but the local level of expertise 
(including language competency for interpreting services and cultural awareness) is 
low. The Balkan region has thus become, according to international reports, a 
‘dumping ground’ for Europe’s asylum seekers who paradoxically enter the Balkan 
countries from EU member states (mainly Bulgaria, Romania and Greece). However, 
an agreement between regional governments and the EU stipulates that asylum 
seekers need to register when they enter a non-EU Balkan state, with one holding 
centre on the border of Serbia and FYROM registering around 600,000 migrants in 
2015 alone.29   
Many experts have warned that the current uncertainty regarding the future of non-
EU candidates from the Balkans, including the very sensitive issue of asylum seekers 
and their repatriation, increases security risks in the EU’s neighbourhood. The Serbian 
Government has cited ‘the risk of new war in the Balkans’ as the reason it is seeking 
closer relations with Russia.30 Undoubtedly, any candidate state that is close to Russia 
will inevitably face additional challenges on its accession path since the EU currently 
imposes sanctions against Russia because of its involvement in the Ukrainian civil war 
and annexation of Crimea. There were reports that nationals from the Balkan region 
are being recruited as paramilitary forces in the Ukrainian civil war by both sides of 
the conflict. The ‘Balkan dimension’ to the Ukrainian conflict adds another layer of 
complexity to already changing political dynamics in that region, including in relation 
to accession. Serbia has not aligned with any of the EU’s key sanctions against Russia, 
which certainly puts its government on a diplomatic collision course with EU member 
states and institutions, in particular the Council and the European Parliament.31  
Well-known commentator on Balkan affairs, Dimitar Bechev, observed that the non-
EU Balkans became even more ostracised from the EU after the Eurozone crisis: 
There is a silent pact between the enlargement-fatigued and crisis-hit EU 
member states and rent-seeking Balkan elites who do not mind slowing the pace 
of reform, with a ‘fire-brigade’ approach to periodic crises and outbursts of 
violence in Kosovo and elsewhere.32 
The current Serbian Government under the dominant influence of Serbia’s President 
Aleksandar Vučić (who served as two-term Prime Minister before becoming the 
President) is seeking closer relations with Russia, in part because of the enlargement 
fatigue. However, the other reason is Serbia’s accession fatigue which is closely linked 
                                                        
29 Alice Greider, ‘Outsourcing migration management. The role of the Western Balkans in the European refugee 
crisis’, 17 August 2017, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/outsourcing-migration-management-western-
balkans-europes-refugee-crisis, accessed 15 December 2017. 
30 Beta news agency, ‘Threat of new war forced Serbia to move closer to Moscow’, 21 December 2017, 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=103099&utm_source=B92&u
tm_medium=Document&utm_campaign=Related-Chrono&utm_content="Threat of new war forced Serbia to 
move closer to Moscow", accessed 15 December 2017. 
31 Since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in 2009, the European Parliament has a much greater weight than 
before on the issue of accession of new members.  
32 Dimitar Bechev, The periphery of the periphery. The Western Balkans and the Euro crisis, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 30 August 2012, p.1, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_periphery_of_the_periphery_the_western_balkans_and_the_e
uro_crisis, accessed 12 December 2017. 
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with the Kosovo issue, with the EU mediating the dialogue between the two parties. 
The EU leads the rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and is treating Kosovo as its 
de facto protectorate and a potential candidate state, even though five EU members 
have not officially recognised Kosovo’s independence.33 These include Cyprus, Greece, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain, mostly because of their fears about their own local 
independence movements seeking recognition and using the Kosovo model for their 
cause.34 Independence movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia within Georgia have 
sought independence citing the Kosovo model in their written submissions to the 
Russian Duma. Russia, however, uses the excuse of the ‘Western states’ recognition of 
Kosovo’ in order to justify its own decision regarding separatist movements in Ukraine 
and Georgia. This is another reason Russia is likely to remain closely involved in the 
Kosovo case in support of Serbia.  
The EU’s negotiating team has not responded to Serbia’s need to address many 
outstanding issues in its relationship with the breakaway province of Kosovo, including 
the highly contentious issue of the privatisation of hundreds of formerly state-owned 
assets. 35  This is one reason Serbia is now seeking Russia’s involvement in its EU-
mediated dialogue with Kosovo, which remains for now a physical and legislative part 
of Serbia according to the Serbian Constitution. Many analysts, as well as EU members 
(in particular Germany), insist that resolving the Kosovo issue ought to be a 
precondition for both Belgrade and Priština to move closer to attaining EU 
membership, which does not appear to be in sight at present. The general feeling is 
that the EU will do everything to avoid having ‘another Cyprus’ among its ranks.36  
The Serbian Government is repeatedly comparing its relationship with Kosovo to the 
Spanish Catalan case, which the European Commission rejects. There can certainly be 
no serious move towards accession until all parties to the dialogue find a common and 
more permanent solution to the issue of Kosovo’s independence and associated issues. 
Some of the more controversial issues include the right of return for more than 
200,000 non-Albanian residents who left Kosovo as a result of the conflict; the 
privatisation of state assets which Serbia deems to be illegal; the protection of the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo; and the prosecution of war crimes committed by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian regular and paramilitary units during the 1998–
99 conflict.  
The Kosovo issue is certainly a litmus-test for the EU’s diplomatic service and the 
overall capacity of EU institutions to bring peace to the neighbourhood. Russia is keen 
to profit from Serbia’s disappointment with the EU over the issue of Kosovo when 
engaging Serbian citizens in its soft power projection (and practical projects on the 
ground). It does not appear that the European Commission has done anything specific 
to counteract Russia’s growing soft power influence in Serbia. Russia’s strategic 
influence extends to new political movements, organisations, formal political parties, 
and all major sectors of the economy, including the education sector in both Serbia and 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Balkans is a testing ground for both EU and non-EU 
countries, which are building new sources of power and influence there. 
Candidate states’ foreign policy as a less visible criterion of 
accession  
The international affairs of all candidate states are carefully watched and scrutinised 
by the EU institutions. In Serbia’s 2016 progress report, the European Commission 
warned the Serbian Government that its dealings with Russia and China in particular 
must be ‘compatible with the EU standards on matters including state aid, public 
procurement, rail safety and interoperability’.37 Serbia’s alignment with common EU 
declarations and Council decisions remains at a relatively low rate of 59 per cent, 
although still ahead of Turkey on 44 per cent. By comparison, Montenegro aligned, 
when invited, with all common positions (at a rate of 100 per cent), Albania de facto 
aligned with all decisions and restrictive measures, and FYROM aligned with 73 per 
cent.38  
For Russia, the Balkans is a more distant area of foreign policy interest and primarily 
in the context of commercial and business ties, except for Serbia with which military 
ties are also developing. Russia’s relationship with the countries on the Balkan 
Peninsula has been uneven over the past decade, but generally not a confrontational 
one. This stands in contrast to other formerly communist states, such as Eastern 
European and Central European states which were previously in the Warsaw Pact 
(unlike the countries of the former Yugoslavia) and which saw the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union as an opportunity to ‘return to Europe’. 39  Poland and the Baltic EU 
members are among the strongest critics of Russia in the EU. Among the candidate 
states from the Balkans, Montenegro’s links with Russia have probably been the closest 
in terms of foreign investment. Montenegro’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in June 2017 would not have been seen in a positive light by the Kremlin, 
but this development did not significantly disturb Russian financial interests in that 
region. Over one third of foreign companies in Montenegro are in the hands of Russian 
investors.  
However, there are many issues which the Montenegrin Government would have to 
tackle before Montenegro could join the EU, including business ties with Russia which 
are frequently associated with domestic corruption.40  Montenegro, like most other 
candidates from the Balkans, has suffered from the challenges of implementing EU 
laws and norms; a condition which can only worsen when combined with enlargement 
and accession fatigue. Another country which has invested on a larger scale in the 
Balkans, apart from Russia, is the People’s Republic of China. China has committed 
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more than 3 billion Euros in investment funding to the Balkan region over the past five 
years.41 This is an unprecedented development, which warrants closer monitoring by 
EU agencies and institutions.   
China in the Balkans - China’s new strategy for Southern and 
Eastern Europe 
Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing has been implementing a new strategy 
for Southern and Eastern Europe. 42  This strategy involves purchasing and/or 
modernising key strategic and infrastructure assets in the countries of interest to the 
Chinese state. It is also a cultural and public diplomacy strategy, which includes the 
strengthening of people-to-people links through joint research, development and 
exchange. For example, in 2015, young political leaders from China and sixteen Central 
and Eastern European countries met in Beijing, which resulted in an exchange 
initiative involving 1,000 young professionals from both regions.43 A leading Chinese 
official addressing the forum urged European participants to ‘enhance coordination 
and cooperation with China in international and regional affairs, “especially in fields 
that concern both sides, such as climate, environment, new energy, security and non-
proliferation”’.44 Some European countries were uneasy about the security aspects of 
this proposal (given the proximity of Western Europe), the role of these countries in 
the EU and China’s continuing assertion of Chinese sovereignty and its military build-
up in the South China Sea.  
China’s historically unprecedented investment drive into Europe’s periphery needs to 
be seen in the context of its global push to become the world’s leading economic 
powerhouse and political player by 2050, which the Chinese President called New 
China’s ‘Dream’. President Xi described the One Belt One Road initiative as the 
centrepiece of his global vision during the 19th Communist Party Congress in Beijing 
(18–24 October 2017), as he also secured another five-year term. The Balkans is a key 
strategic area within China’s One Belt One Road initiative (also known as the Balkan 
Silk Road route), linking the vital Greek port of Piraeus to Central Europe. By 
successfully undertaking infrastructure, telecommunications, energy and railway 
projects in Southeast Europe, China is building up its portfolio of achievements in 
Europe which should make it a more competitive player when bidding for projects in 
the EU’s largest economies.  
The Balkans serving as a Chinese gateway to Europe is not a new concept. In the 1990s, 
tens of thousands of Chinese citizens profited from a special agreement between 
Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China. It is estimated that in 1998 alone, 
Chinese traders took about US$1 billion worth of profits out of Yugoslavia.45 Many 
established small businesses in the Balkans are the first step on the traders’ journey 
towards Western Europe.46 In Serbia alone, it is estimated that over 80,000 Chinese 
passed through, many of whom went on to build their own communities in larger cities 
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and successfully run regional businesses, despite highly damaging (for the local trading 
capacity) international trade embargoes against rump Yugoslavia. 47  Many Chinese 
were familiar with the idea that Tito’s Yugoslavia used to be quite an open and 
Western-oriented communist country with admirable standards of living (especially 
relative to all other communist countries). Their economic presence was also 
supported by the Serbian and Chinese governments.  
Given the history of the successful establishment of small and medium-sized Chinese 
businesses across the Balkans, it is of little surprise then that President Xi’s China is 
courting political elites in this region in the hope that they will be receptive to China’s 
large state-owned companies, which are bringing in billions of dollars in new deals 
(such as the proposed high-speed railway line from Piraeus to Budapest worth over $3 
billion). 48  However, most of these Central and Eastern European countries run 
widening trade deficits in their relations with China, with one regional politician 
observing that the relationship is like that between an ant and an elephant, with China 
being on the winning side of most trade deals.49 
16+1 Forums 
A surge in Chinese official delegations in recent times to Central and Eastern Europe 
underlines, therefore, the growing interest shown by the Chinese Government and 
companies in that region.50  These countries are currently part of China’s so-called 
‘16+1’ annual summit with Central and Eastern European leaders, which started in 
2012.51 The largest Chinese delegation of 200 business and political leaders, led by 
China’s Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, travelled to Serbia and Poland in June 
2016. There are also regular business summits and business support organisations 
within annual heads-of-government meetings between sixteen countries of Southern 
and Eastern Europe and China.52 
Chinese aspirations to become a leading global power by 2050 have been met with 
resounding scepticism in the West, including in Australia. However, Chinese power 
dynamics are left unchecked and largely unquestioned in the Balkans, with the Greek 
Foreign Minister recently praising Xi Jinping’s global ambitions as another leap in 
China’s Great Transformation. Greece, an EU member since 1986, has lauded China’s 
role in addressing common challenges, which grates with many Western nations in 
light of China’s assertive expansionist policies in the South China Sea region and 
elsewhere. 53  An example of China’s diplomatic success in the Balkans is Greece’s 
blocking of the European Union’s public criticism at the United Nations of China’s 
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human rights record, alongside two other statements.54 The Greek example shows that 
the European Union is not coherent in its China policy, with Hungary also siding with 
the Greek position and diluting the EU’s more assertive stance towards China in 
international forums.55 
Transforming the Balkan region  
Analyst Jen Bastian observed in his report on the impact of the Balkan Silk Road 
project that through this initiative, the Chinese Government is providing below-market 
loans with low interest rates to ‘companies and political personalities in Southeast 
Europe’, thereby creating for itself leverage for ‘acquisitions and infrastructure 
innovation on an unprecedented scale’. While this drive is certainly welcomed by 
countries which face limitations in terms of private sector lending or which are 
restricted in their attractiveness as investment destinations globally, it raises concerns 
about debt dependency on Chinese providers. Bastian concludes that the Balkan Silk 
Road can help transform the Western Balkans, and from the Chinese perspective, it 
brings this peripheral region ‘into a more centrally positioned part of an integrated 
Eurasian economic zone that Beijing envisions’.56 However, this transformation may 
also mean that the Balkan region could move further away from the Brussels orbit into 
a semi-regulated and increasingly authoritarian governance mode that is heavily 
dependent upon Beijing. A less-publicised clause in many investment agreements 
between China and the Balkan countries is that Chinese law would prevail in dispute 
resolution. This puts Balkan countries potentially in conflict with the EU’s regulatory 
and normative framework.57 
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China as a new dominant trading partner in Southeast Europe 
China’s acquisition of Piraeus and its massive infrastructure investment in the Balkans 
was an impetus behind the European Commission’s decision to further block China’s 
advances towards the acquisition of Europe’s strategic assets—but this does not 
automatically extend to non-EU members in the Balkan region. 58  Most of these 
countries are open and receptive to China’s new soft power projection, actively seeking 
investment in projects ranging from infrastructure (power plants, roads, bridges and 
railways) to science and research.59 For example, by the end of the first quarter of 2017, 
China surpassed Albania’s traditional trading partners of Greece and Turkey to become 
Albania’s second-largest trading partner.60 China purchased controlling rights over 
Albania’s two major oil fields, entered into a partnership agreement over Tirana 
International Airport and invested in Albanian infrastructure projects.61 This is an 
example of China’s growing trading edge in the Balkans, which is traditionally an area 
of strategic competition between Russia and the West, in which China is a relative 
newcomer. Michal Makocki from the European Council on Foreign Relations has 
warned that Chinese investment in the Balkan Silk Route project will ‘replicate China’s 
preference for [politicised] state-led rather than market-based decisions’, which, in his 
view, runs contrary to the EU’s ‘model of open and transparent bidding procedures’.62  
The spread of Chinese influence has also provided political leaders in the Balkans with 
greater leverage against their opponents.63 The Chinese funding offers an alternative 
to EU-oriented reforms and funding that is often linked with strict EU accession 
conditionality. However, governments of the Balkan countries dislike and reject any 
such comparison. In 2016, the Bank of China (that usually accompanies Chinese-led 
infrastructure investments) became the largest foreign bank in asset ownership to 
operate in the Balkans, opening a regional branch in Serbia. Macedonian President 
Gjorge Ivanov explicitly remarked that the EU’s failure to engage more and invest in 
the Balkans has left the door open to Chinese and Russian ‘strategic encroachment’ in 
that region.64  
China’s anti-NATO sentiment  
Furthermore, Chinese investment in the Balkans is, when convenient, linked with its 
recent historical experiences. For example, Chinese and Serbian investors are jointly 
constructing a large Chinese cultural centre at the place where a former Chinese 
embassy once stood, which was targeted during the NATO offensive military campaign 
against rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999. The protests which broke 
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out across China against the NATO action in May 1999 were unprecedented, and 
personally approved by China’s then Vice-President, Hu Jintao. 65  They involved 
hundreds of thousands of people, including students—as the Chinese Government 
allowed student organisations to lead the protests—in stark contrast to the Tiananmen 
Square events only a decade earlier. The anti-NATO sentiment that still lingers in much 
of Serbia is selectively employed by the Chinese visiting delegations, and often invoked 
in official speeches which underscore the significance of bilateral relations between the 
two countries. 66  Whereas for China, the Balkans is an increasingly important, yet 
relatively distant, area of foreign and defence policy significance, the EU candidate 
states in the Balkans are well aware of the need to maintain a careful balancing act 
between the EU, Russia and China. How well they manage to carry out this foreign 
policy manoeuvring, and still fulfil the EU’s stringent accession criteria, will be an 
indication of whether they will become closer to, or drift further away from, ‘Europe’.  
Conclusion 
This paper examined the twin trends of enlargement fatigue and accession fatigue 
which can be observed in contemporary European politics both in relation to EU 
foreign policy and the projection of its norms and modelling in the immediate 
neighbourhood, the Balkans. While the EU has failed to sustain the momentum of 
enlargement among its key institutions, it has stopped short of abandoning the policy 
of enlargement altogether, instead focusing on a range of internal reforms and 
challenges. This situation, which may not be historically unprecedented, has proved to 
be a setback for accession efforts by candidate states in the Balkans, whose political 
and business elites are increasingly turning to non-EU partners and institutions. While 
Russian investment has been present in the Balkan region for over a decade, including 
in strategic assets, China’s more recently completed acquisition of large-scale and 
previously government-owned assets in the Balkan states, as well as investment in new 
projects (worth several billion Euros overall), may further reduce the EU’s credibility 
as a key player in the Balkans and the attractiveness of the EU’s governance model. The 
EU’s foreign policy towards the candidate states in the Balkans should move beyond a 
centre-periphery mentality into a more inclusive framework for cooperation. 
Otherwise, three scenarios are likely to arise given the increased presence, actorness 
and financial power of non-EU actors in the Balkans, particularly Russia and China.  
The first is the best-case scenario, which, for now, appears to be highly unlikely. This 
scenario presupposes that all four official EU candidates from the Balkans will 
successfully complete EU-oriented market and political reforms, and align themselves 
as closely as possible with EU structures and norms. Even if that happens, it is still 
unclear whether the EU’s appetite for further enlargement will increase beyond the 
current respite from enlargement. The second scenario is a gradual slowing down of 
accession reforms, as the EU’s attractiveness wanes, and turning to new geopolitical 
options with non-EU external players, which may sit very uneasily with EU institutions 
and member states. This scenario will push candidate states further away from their 
current goal of joining the EU. The third scenario is an uneven progress in reforms, 
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and a political decision by the EU to accept those candidates who have shown political 
commitment to the EU’s values and norms, and its common decisions and 
declarations, including in the foreign policy arena. Countries such as Montenegro 
could fall within that category, whereas countries like Albania and Serbia would fall 
into the next category of non-membership and closer attachment (and dependency) to 
China and Russia. The FYROM is in a difficult situation as the name issue with Greece 
is complicating its efforts to join both the EU and NATO, despite recent moves to rectify 
this peculiar situation.  
A responsibility probably lies with leaders of both the EU and candidate states to affirm 
commitment to the European perspective by the candidates, as well as potential 
candidates whose future is presently uncertain. The EU would need to rescue its dream 
of providing guidance and role-modelling to others—including states in its immediate 
neighbourhood—whose reforms are directly reliant on the EU’s increased levels of 
funding and political commitment to membership. In the absence of correct signalling, 
the EU risks further eroding its image and the credibility of its foreign policy and 
enlargement policy in the future. Russia and China are among the external players who 
have entered the Balkan region with new confidence and different foreign and security 
policy outlooks from those of the Western countries.  
As frictions increase on a global level between members of the EU and Russia and 
China, the candidate states in the Balkans will be oscillating between those competing 
interests in order to survive. Yet, their survival could well mean aligning with distant 
non-democratic states to the detriment of the EU’s many decades of transformative 
efforts to preserve peace in the Balkans. Elites in the EU currently remain focused on 
Brexit and the need for internal reform; yet a failure to recognise that the EU should 
step up its efforts in areas such as foreign policy and enlargement policy will likely have 
more negative consequences for the foreseeable future, warranting the involvement of 
the United States in countering the new interests of Russia and China in the EU’s still 
highly volatile neighbourhood.67 
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